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In whose court do they belong?
The Solorio decision changes the rules
hile celebrating at a lo-
l i cal bar located outside
L j Fort Blank, Sergeant
W Smith is involved in a
fight that leaves two
civilians badly beaten.
Smith is arrested and taken to the
local civilian jail. He retains a local
civilian attorney who calls the dis-
trict attorney with the question,
"Who is going to prosecute my
client?" A year ago the answer
would probably have been: "the lo-
cal DA." Now, the answer is not so
simple. In Solorio v. United States,
107 S.Ct 2924 (1987), the U.S. Su-
preme Court expanded court-
martial subject matter jurisdiction
and made prosecution by military
authorities a viable alternative for
otherwise "civilian" offenses.
On its face, the Solorio decision
is of little, if any, interest to civilian
practitioners in criminal justice. The
ramifications of this major shift in ju-
risdiction, however, will no doubt be
felt not only by military prosecutors,
but also civilian prosecutors, de-
fense counsel, and investigative
agencies. Although it is early to as-
sess the full impact of this decision,
a number of local prosecutors and
defense counsel have already be-
gun to realize its practical implica-
tions.
Limits on military jurisdiction
In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled
that the military's jurisdiction was
limited to those offenses which were
"service-connected." In O'Callahan,
the accused had been tried by court-
martial for various offenses arising out
of his attempted rape of a young ci-
vilian girl in a Honolulu hotel while
on leave. Writing for a majority of five
members, Justice Douglas noted an
historical distrust for military jurisdic-
tion and that it should therefore be
limited to the least extent necessary,
i.e., those offenses which are service
connected. The underlying consti-
tutional rationale for this limitation
was that military criminal trials did not
provide the traditional Fifth Amend-
ment right to indictment by grand
jury and the Sixth Amendment right
to a trial by jury. The charged offen-
ses, said the Court, were of the type
typically prosecuted in civilian courts
and the civilian courts were open and
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operating. In dissent, Justice Harlan
predicted that "infinite permutations
of possibly relevant factors are bound
to create confusion and proliferate
litigation over the [court-martial] ju-
risdiction issue." 395 U.S. at 284. His
observation was prophetic.
Faced with some of these per-
mutations, the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of military sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971),
and still later in Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975). In Rel-
ford, the Court listed 21 factors that
should be considered in determin-
ing whether a particular offense was
"service connected" and therefore
within the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the military courts. But, four
years later in Schlesinger, the Court
seemed to abandon the 21-factor
test and indicated that service con-
nection was largely gauged by bal-
ancing military and civilian interests
in the prosecution of the offense.
These decisions did little to settle
the often hotly contested issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. In the
intervening years the military courts
themselves shifted positions from a
liberal reading of the service con-
nection requirement, to a strict
reading, and most recently back to
a broader perspective. These shifts
were most apparent in drug related
cases, where the Court of Military
Appeals finally held that virtually
every drug offense committed by
servicemembers, whether commit-
ted on or off a military installation,
would fall within the subject matter
jurisdiction of military courts. United
States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A.
1980).
Although no recent hard data has
been collected, it has been generally
assumed that many minor offenses
committed by servicemembers in the
civilian community were never pros-
ecuted. In some instances, civilian
prosecutors simply were unable, or
unwilling, due to budget or time
constraints, to actively pursue pros-
ecution of military offenders. On the
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other hand, if the military decided to
prosecute, under military case law
the military prosecutor was required
to allege and prove the service con-
nection requirement in every of-
fense. Frequently, either the trial or
appellate courts would conclude that
no subject matter jurisdiction ex-
isted. Needless to say, many viewed
the service connection requirement
as a troublesome barrier, based
largely on a distrust of a justice sys-
tem that had since matured and gen-




The service connection require-
ment was finally abandoned and
O'Callahan overruled in Solorio v.
United States, 107 S.Ct. 2924 (1987).
While assigned to a Coast Guard
unit in Juneau, Alaska, the accused
committed numerous acts of sexual
abuse against two minor daughters
of other Coast Guard members. The
crimes were not discovered, how-
ever, until after he had been trans-
ferred to Governors Island, New
York, where he committed addi-
tional acts of sexual abuse on other
daughters of Coast Guardsmen. On
a defense motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, the military judge
concluded that the Alaska offenses
were not service connected, but the
New York offenses were since they
had been committed in govern-
ment quarters. On a government
appeal of that ruling, the Coast
Guard Court of Military Review held
that there was sufficient service
connection over the Alaska offen-
ses. 21 M.J. 512 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985).
The United States Court of Military
Appeals affirmed, noting that "sex
offenses against young chil-
dren ... have a continuing effect on
the victims and their families and ul-
timately on the morale of any mili-
tary unit or organization to which the
family member is assigned." 21 M.J.
251, 256 (C.M.A. 1986). The court
also considered the benefits to both
the accused and the government
from trying the Alaska and New York
offenses at the same trial, the ad-
verse impact of returning some of
the victims to Alaska to testify at any
civilian trial, and the civilian prose-
cutor's interest in trying the ac-
cused.
On certiorari review, the Su-
preme Court affirmed. Writing for
five members of the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that juris-
diction of a court-martial depends
solely on the defendant's status as a
member of the armed forces, not
service connection. In overruling
O'Callahan, the Court noted that the
case had departed from the long-
standing precedent that status of the
accused as a servicemember was the
key, and that the historical reason-
ing in O'Callahan for limiting juris-
diction was based upon a less-than-
accurate reading of history. Instead,
said the Court, there was over-
whelming support of Justice Har-
lan's dissent in O'Callahan that the
plain language in Article 1, §8, cI 14
gave Congress plenary power to de-
termine the extent of military juris-
diction. Comparing that power to
Congress' broad commerce clause
powers, the Court noted that in mil-
itary affairs it has deferred to Con-
gress in a variety of contexts where
the individual constitutional rights
of servicemembers were impli-
cated. See, e.g. Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. - (1986) (military
restriction on servicemember's free
exercise of religion); Rosker v. Gold-
berg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (restriction
on assignments for female service-
members).
In dissent, Justice Marshall dis-
agreed with the majority's historical
analysis and noted that it had com-
pletely ignored the underlying ra-
tionale of O'Callahan-that courts-
martial deny servicemembers the
rights to indictment by grand jury
and a jury trial. Justice Marshall rec-
ognized that application of the Rel-
ford factors was difficult, time-
consuming and required narrow
lines, but that it was necessary be-
cause "[t]he trial of any person be-
fore a court-martial encompasses a
deliberate decision to withhold pro-
cedural protections guaranteed by
the Constitution." 107 S.Ct at 2941.
In applying the Relford factors to this
case, Justice Marshall concluded
that there was no service connec-
Criminal Justice16
tion over the off-base Alaska offen-
ses. Finally, he noted that the
majority's abandonment of the
service connection requirement re-
flected "contempt, both for the
members of our armed forces and
for the constitutional safeguards in-
tended to protect us all." 107 S.Ct
at 2941.
Constitutional implications
In abandoning the service con-
nection requirement, the Court has
certainly simplified the process of
determining whether a court-martial
has jurisdiction over the offense.
Now, virtually every "civilian" of-
fense may be tried in a military court
if the defendant has military "sta-
tus." This assumes that Congress will
not otherwise limit such jurisdiction
by indicating that certain offenses
are not triable in courts-martial. To
date, the legislative trend has been
to add to the list of those offenses
which are cognizable in military
courts. For example, in 1986, the
court added the offense of espio-
nage to the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice. Article 106a, U.C.M.J.,
10 U.S.C. 906a. Even absent spe-
cific legislative changes, Article 134
of the U.C.M.J. (the general article)
is usually available as a source for
prosecution of "civilian" offenses
which have not otherwise been
written into the U.C.M.J. Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
It is important to note that in So-
lorio the Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the constitutionality of any
particular aspect of the court-martial
process. Although it might be ar-
gued that the Court implicity blessed
this worldwide system of criminal
justice, it is probably safer to con-
clude that the Court only decided
the narrower question of whether
the service connection requirement
was constitutionally required. That
means that various aspects of the
military criminal system are still sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny. Given
the Court's recent deferential re-
view of congressional actions in this
area, it seems doubtful that the
Court would dismantle parts of the
system-as long as Congress had
any rational basis for determining
that a particular procedural protec-
tion otherwise available in civilian
trials was not feasible in military
practice.
Finally, the full impact of Solorio
may reach beyond subject matter
jurisdiction questions. For example,
its reaffirmation of Congress' vir-
tually unlimited powers in deter-
mining what offenses are triable in
military courts might be extended
to its determinations of who is sub-
ject to military criminal prosecution.
This would be particularly impor-
tant in assessing the constitutional-
ity of U.C.M.J. provisions which
attempt to extend jurisdictions over
civilian employees, discharged ser-
vicemembers and reservists. In the
past those provisions were read nar-
rowly by the Court because of the
same constitutional rationale which
undergirded the service connection
rule-the lack of grand jury indict-
ment and jury trial. See, e.g., Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (no ju-
risdiction over discharged service-
member for offenses committed
while on active duty).
Ironically, just months before the
court decided Solorio, Congress
amended Articles 2 and 3 of the
U.C.M.J. to permit the government
to order a reservist to active duty for
purpose of nonjudicial punishment,
an Article 32 Investigation (a proce-
dure similar in function to the grand
jury), or a court-martial. Further, ter-
mination of a period of active duty
or inactive duty for training (i.e.,
weekend drills) will not terminate ju-
risdiction over the reservist. In light
of Solorio, these most recent legis-
lative expansions of jurisdiction will
probably withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Although this statutory
change is not as dramatic as the im-
pact of Solorio, it nonetheless dem-
onstrates a trend to expand court-
martial jurisdiction. And that, in turn,
will affect how civilian prosecutors
and defense attorneys approach
cases involving servicemembers who
have committed offenses in the ci-
vilian community.
Solorio in practice
The Solorio decision expands the
concurrent jurisdiction between
Spring 1988
both the military and the state and
federal authorities which in many
instances is already reflected in cur-
rent formal or informal agreements.
Those agreements should now be
reviewed and assessed in light of
Solorio. Rather than establishing
standardized agreements on a na-
tionwide basis, the armed services
have generally permitted individual
military installations or commands
to negotiate such agreements with
local prosecutors. One county pros-
ecutor, for instance, in reponse to
Solorio is now holding weekly
meetings with a military prosecutor
from a nearby major Army installa-
tion to determine responsibility for
prosecuting servicemembers who
have committed offenses in the ci-
vilian community.
When there is concurrent juris-
diction in both civilian and military
courts, the issue of priority of pros-
ecution is largely a question of com-
ity. As one might imagine, the
negotiations between state, federal,
and military prosecutors about
where a particular case should be
tried may become a delicate matter.
Military prosecutors may become
concerned that even with the ex-
pansion of military jurisdiction, they
will only inherit those cases which
are considered by civilian prosecu-
tors to be "losers" or otherwise in-
significant. Civilian prosecutors, on
the other hand, who are account-
able to a civilian populace are gen-
erally not anxious to relinquish
control over major cases which have
the public's eye. Although the de-
fendant cannot choose which forum
will try him, defense counsel could
theoretically affect the question of
forum through attractive offers of
plea bargaining in one forum or the
other. Thus, in some instances an
alert defense attorney can influence
the question of where a particular
servicemember will be prosecuted.
This means of course that civilian
counsel will have to acquire some
working knowledge of military jus-
tice procedures or policies.
In deciding the issue of forum, it
is especially incumbent upon civil-
ian and military prosecutors to con-
(Continued on page 36)
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defendants may provide informa-
tion exposing the defendant to a
higher guideline range sentence
than was faced based on the infor-
mation known to the government at
the time the deal was struck. A de-
fendant who inculpates himself, co-
operates for a time, and then backs
out or is unable to deliver the co-
operation sought by the govern-
ment, faces the greatest danger of
significantly increased exposure.
This situation is comparable to the
defendant who has no one to co-
operate against, but who participat-
ed in more substantial or additional
criminal conduct beyond that
known to the government at the
agreement stage.
Under such circumstances, what
is the incentive to a defendant to re-
veal additional facts? What protec-
tion does a defendant have against
increasing the exposure faced, oth-
er than the normal protections
against proffered information being
used directly to incriminate? Could
an agreement be structured so that
the additional incriminating infor-
mation is only revealed in the prof-
fer context, unless it is needed to
manifest cooperation? How can a
plea agreement be structured that
allows for subsequent inclusion of
information relevant to guideline
application that is not known at the
time of the plea agreement, such as
the applicability of specific offense
characteristics or adjustments, the
Criminal History calculation, or the
applicability of the career offender
or criminal livelihood provisions?
The nature and structure of plea
agreements may have to be modi-
fied to retain incentives to plead
guilty, to reveal all facts of criminal
wrongdoing, and to cooperate
without risking exposure to added
penalties. Towards this end, agree-
ments may have to be structured
that accomplish the following: leave
for subsequent resolution disputed
or undetermined factors or infor-
mation; establish a limitation on ex-
posure given known facts or
specified unknown ones (possibly
through a cap or agreement on the
offense level or guideline range); al-
low a specific sentence bargain; or
agree to the applicability of certain
enhancements or adjustments based
on undisputed sentencing facts.
Obviously, the parties may want
to attempt to have some or all of the
presentence report completed be-
fore the plea agreement. Any incen-
tives relevant to an agreement may
often be more effectively struc-
tured. At the conclusion of the
guideline application process, the
judge can choose a point within the
range, giving reasons for this choice
only if the maximum exceeds the
minimum by 24 months, or other-
wise departs from the range.
Throughout the calculation of the
appropriate guideline range, rele-
vant factors, which were not ade-
quately considered during the
calculations and are not explicitly
excluded from consideration by the
guidelines, may be evaluated by the
judge.
Ultimately, the guidelines must be
applied, and relevant issues litigat-
ed, in light of the sentencing goals
expressed by the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984: deter-
ring crime, incapacitating the of-
fender, providing just punishment,
and rehabilitating the offender.
Practitioners face a new system of
guideline sentencing that purports
to be more rational, structured and
orderly than prior law. Survival un-
der the system will require a thor-
ough knowledge of the changed
system before traditional litigation
skills may be effectively used. CJ
(Continued from page 17)
sider a variety of substantive,
procedural and evidentiary factors
which may make it more feasible or
advantageous to prosecute in a mil-
itary proceeding. It is certainly be-
yond the scope of this article to
compare civilian and military crimi-
nal trials in depth. But the point can
be made by briefly discussing sev-
eral key procedural and evidentiary
rules.
Substantive considerations
In assessing the feasibility of a
military prosecution it is important
to note that almost all of the com-
mon law offenses are proscribed
under the punitive articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Articles 77 to 134; 10 U.S.C. §§ 877
to 934, and apply without regard to
where the offense was committed.
Thus, in the opening scenario, Ser-
geant Smith could be prosecuted in
a military court for the typical as-
sault offenses or for a variety of other
offenses related to disorderly con-
duct and public intoxication as a vi-
olation of Article 134-the General
Article. If there is no specific puni-
tive article proscribing the offense,
Article 134 permits the military to
prosecute a servicemember for
noncapital federal crimes and of-
fenses. That same provision would
permit prosecution for a state of-
fense under the Assimilative Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. §13, if the charged
offense occurred at a location within
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdic-
tion of the United States and if there
were no federal statute preempting
application of the state provision.
Williams v. United States, 327 U.S.
711 (1946). Article 134 could also
serve as a basis of prosecuting a state
crime which either is to the preju-
dice of good order and discipline of
the armed services or is conduct
which brings discredit upon the
armed forces. Again, this assumes
that no punitive article in the
U.C.M.1. already proscribes the
same conduct. See e.g., United States
v. Irvin, 21 M.J. 184 (C.M.A. 1986)
(discussion of applicability of var-
ious provisions of Article 134 to state
statute covering child abuse). In
short, in many instances a military
prosecution may provide the pros-
ecutor with a broader range of
choices from the military, federal, or
Criminal Justice136
state penal codes.
It is also important to consider the
differences in both the sentence
limitations and probable sentence
in the military and civilian courts.
While it would be incorrect to as-
sume that a sentence imposed by a
court-martial would always be
heavier than that imposed in a ci-
vilian court, certain conduct in the
military is likely to result in a heavier
sentence. For example, drug of-
fenses almost always result in at least
nonjudicial punishment, infra, and
in some military commands, any
drug use or possession, including
marijuana, results in criminal
charges. See generally United States
v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980)
(discussion of the serious threat
posed by drug use in the military).
For the sake of comparison, wrong-
ful use of marijuana (less than 30
grams) could result in a maximum
punishment of a dishonorable dis-
charge and confinement for two
years. If more than 30 grams of mar-
ijuana is involved, the maximum
permissible confinement is in-




used in federal criminal trials. In
1984, the President of the United
States promulgated an updated
Manual for Courts-Martial which
now sets out "Rules for Courts-
Martial" (R.C.M.). The terminology
may seem foreign, but those famil-
iar with the system will attest to the
fact that it is an efficient and well-
run worldwide system of criminal
justice. Cook, "Courts-Martial: The
Third System in American Criminal
Law," 1978 S. III. U. L. ]. 1.
To the extent that timeliness is a
consideration in deciding who
should prosecute a servicemember,
it should be noted that the military
criminal justice system generally
processes cases in a short period of
time because the requirements of
military readiness and operations
can ill afford long and drawn-out
proceedings. The requirement of
expeditious handling of military
Spring 1988
charges is exemplified in speedy trial
rules.
Like the federal system and most
jurisdictions, military prosecutors are
bound by several speedy trial rules
which may be triggered not only by
Sixth Amendment rules, see Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but
also by statutory and executive di-
rectives. For example, under the
1984 Manual for Courts-Martial,
servicemembers must be tried with
120 days of the date that charges
are proferred. More stringent rules
apply if the servicemember has
been placed in pretrial confine-
ment.
A second important procedural
consideration involves discovery
and production of witnesses. The
military has very broad discovery
rules that provide for not only lib-
eral discovery by the defense, but
also reciprocal discovery by the
prosecution and notice by the de-
fense of the insanity and alibi defen-
ses. The 1984 Manual for Courts-
Martial also contains a reverse Jencks
Act disclosure requirement. The
Jencks Act requires disclosure of
pretrial statements made by a pros-
ecution witness after that witness
has testified. 18 U.S.C. 3500. The
military rule on the other hand re-
quires disclosure of previous state-
ments made by both prosecution
and defense witnesses. R.C.M. 914.
This obviously presents an addi-
tional avenue of prosecution dis-
covery not otherwise found in many
jurisdictions.
Many military prosecutions result
in some type of negotiated plea
agreement which is later subjected
to close scrutiny at the time the de-
fendant enters his plea of guilty be-
fore the military judge. The military
courts have recognized the value of
negotiated pleas, and in recent
years, have permitted the defen-
dant greater leeway in striking a plea
bargain with the government. For
example, a common provision in a
military pretrial agreement is the de-
fendant's waiver of various suppres-
sion motions. For the defendant's
part, the most common benefit bar-
gained for is a reduced sentence.
And, where a victim has suffered
monetary losses, a plea agreement
might include the defendant's
promise to make restitution.
It is important to emphasize that
not all offenses, whether committed
in the civilian or military commu-
nity, necessarily result in a trial. Mi-
nor offenses, for example, are most
often dealt with through nonjudicial
punishment imposed by the ser-
vicemember's commander. See Ar-
ticle 15, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. 815.
However, unless the servicemem-
ber is assigned to a vessel, he has
the right to refuse such punishment
and demand a trial by court-martial.
Because of that right to demand trial,
in the past many commanders re-
frained from offering nonjudicial
punishment for minor offenses
committed in the civilian commu-
nity unless there was some service
connection which would, if neces-
sary, support a trial if one was de-
manded. Now that the service
connection requirement has been
abrogated, it seems likely that more
minor offenses committed within
the civilian community will result in
nonjudicial punishment.
Repeated acts of misconduct may
warrant one of several types of ad-
ministrative discharge from the
armed services. Indeed, one ground
for an administrative discharge is
that the servicemember has been
convicted in a civilian court of a fel-
ony offense.
Finally, although principles of
double jeopardy will bar trials for the
same offense in both a federal court
and a military court, because they are
of the same sovereign, Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959),
in theory a servicemember may be
prosecuted for the same offense in
both a state and military court. How-
ever, the armed services generally
discourage such double punishment
and a successful prosecution of a
servicemember in state proceedings
will normally preclude further mili-
tary prosecution. See, e.g., Army Reg.
27-10, Chapter 4. But failure to fol-
low those regulations will probably
not be considered jurisdictional er-




In addition to examining military
criminal procedural rules, civilian
prosecutors should weigh military
evidentiary rules which may make it
more likely that the court will con-
sider certain evidence. Again, only
selected evidentiary rules are dis-
cussed here to make the point that
sometimes a difference in the mili-
tary rules may be important to con-
sider in determining who will try a
servicemember.
Like many of the procedural rules
of courts-martial, the military evi-
dentiary rules closely parallel the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Since
1980, the admissibility of evidence
in military criminal trials has been
governed by the Military Rules of
Evidence. Many of those rules are
verbatim renditions of the federal
counterpart with two major excep-
tions. First, instead of setting out
rules regarding presumptions in
what is Article Ili of the Federal
Rules, the military counterpart in-
cludes detailed rules governing the
admissibility of evidence resulting
from search and seizures, state-
ments by the accused, and eyewit-
ness identification. Second, the
Military Rules of Evidence, unlike
the federal version, delineate de-
tailed rules governing evidentiary
privileges.
Despite the similarity with the
federal rules, there are key differ-
ences which may be important fac-
tors in deciding who should
prosecute a servicemember. For ex-
ample, Military Rule of Evidence
803(6) specifically treats laboratory
reports and other law enforcement
instruments as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. United States v.
Holmes, 23 M.J. 565 (A.C.M.R. 1986)
(laboratory report). And Military Rule
of Evidence 803(8) also permits in-
troduction of similar instruments.
The federal rules contain no such
specific exceptions and federal case
law generally blocks the admissibil-
ity of those documents. See gener-
ally, United Stated v. Oates, 560 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1977).
Like the federal evidentiary rules,
the Military Rules of Evidence also
contain a residual hearsay excep-
tion in Rules 803(24) and 804(5).
Those provisions have been used in
child abuse cases where the child
victim has made statements impli-
cating the servicemember-parent. In
United States v. Rousseau, 21 M.J.
960 (A.C.M.R. 1986), the court
noted that "military society has a
compelling interest in protecting the
welfare of a soldier's family. For that
reason, the residual exceptions are
particularly well suited to [the hear-
say problems arising in intrafamily
offenses]."
The Supreme Court's decision in
Solorio v. United States is significant
for several reasons. First, by aban-
doning the O'Callahan service con-
nection requirement for determining
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court
has signaled a growing deference for
Congress' decisions on what of-
fenses may be prosecuted in the
military criminal justice system. It
also presents new options for both
civilian and military prosecutors. In
effect, the decision creates concur-
rent jurisdiction between military
and civilian prosecutors over ser-
vicemembers who have committed
offenses in the civilian community.
For the civilian prosecutor this
means that in deciding whether to
proceed with criminal charges
against a servicemember a number
of procedural and evidentiary fac-
tors should be considered. In any
given case, one or more of these
factors may make military prosecu-
tion under Solorio a viable alterna-
tive.
If a servicemember ends up'being
tried in a military court, defense
counsel may find him or herself
working within the military criminal
justice system.
Thus, for both prosecutors and
defense counsel, the Supreme
Court's decision in Solorio is bound
to affect civilian criminal justice in
many jurisdictions-especially those
in proximity to military installations.
Multiple Defendants ....... 71 tit
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may be willing to stipulate to such
matters to enable a particular de-
fendant to receive a less severe sen-
tence in return for a guilty plea. Even
more important, codefendants' sen-
tences vary dramatically under the
guidelines depending on whether
they are characterized as an "organ-
izer," a "supervisor," a "minimal
participant" or a "minor partici-
pant" in the criminal activity. This
itself creates a likely conflict of in-
terest for counsel representing co-
defendants, who must make a case
for a particular client's lesser culpa-
bility, thereby exposing another
client to the obvious conclusion that
he was the "organizer" or "super-
visor."
In addition to the many factual
determinations that differentiate
codefendants under the sentencing
guidelines, judges are given discre-
tion to depart from the guidelines
when they find "aggravating or mit-
igating circumstances of a kind, or
to a degree, that was not adequately
taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. §
3553 (b). Thus defense counsel may
often find it appropriate to argue that
a particular client's case is suffi-
ciently unusual to justify a depar-
ture. An attorney making such an
argument must not be constrained
in saying that the defendant in
question is worthy of different treat-
ment from similarly situated defen-
dants. For more information on the
impact of the federal sentencing
guidelines, see the article, "Better
Do Your Homework," by Donald A.
Purdy, Jr. and Michael Goldsmith on
page 2.
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